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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of technological risk on long–run growth
when labor supply is elastic and production gives rise to a pollution external-
ity. For the social planner as well as for the market economy we show that the
randomness of production as well as the endogeneity of labor supply matter with
respect to the equilibrium solution. The direction in which changes in the model
parameters as well as changes of policy instruments influence labor supply and
growth depends crucially on the volatility of output.
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JEL classification: Q5, O4, D8, D9
1 Introduction
As the debate on climate change shows very clearly, the consequences of environ-
mental degradation for economic development is subject to a large degree of uncer-
tainty. This uncertainty arises from a variety of different sources such as ecological
and technological risks, but also the stochastic dynamics of population. Yet, although
uncertainty features prominently in the current debate on sustainability, its potential
implications have rarely been analyzed in the literature on growth and the environ-
ment. In this paper we show that incorporating uncertainty might not only affect the
optimal static and dynamic characteristics of optimal policy design, but might also
alter the growth implications of, for example, environmental taxation.
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To keep the analysis tractable we concentrate on one potential source of uncer-
tainty, technological risk, and show that in the presence of this risk the effects of
environmental policy might even be reversed compared to the a deterministic set-
ting. In contrast to the main body of literature in this field, we assume labor supply
to be endogenously determined. We show that neglecting the reaction of the labor-
leisure choice to changes in environmental policy might result in a wrong assessment
of policy implications.1
In recent years an large body of literature has dealt with the mutual interde-
pendency of economic growth and environmental degradation. Especially the de-
velopment of endogenous growth theory has renewed the interest in this field,
leading to an extensive analysis of the general conditions under which long–
run growth can be feasible and optimal in the presence of environmental restric-
tions. These restrictions originate from a large number of sources such as rival
and non–rival productivity effects as well as environmental amenities of renew-
able resources (e.g. Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995, 1996; Smulders, 1998; Grimaud,
1999; Elíasson and Turnovsky, 2004), exhaustible resources (e.g. Aghion and Howitt,
1998; Scholz and Ziemes, 1999; Schou, 2000) and stock or flow pollution (e.g.
Gradus and Smulders, 1993; Smulders, 1996; Stokey, 1998).2 The vast majority
of this literature, however, does not consider the effects of uncertainty, but rather
assumes that technological as well as ecological components are deterministic.
There are some exceptions to this rule however. Baranzini and Bourguignon
(1995), for instance, consider a non–zero probability of extinction while
Beltratti et al. (1998) and, more recently, Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2004)
include uncertainty about future preferences. Technically closest to our analysis is
probably Soretz (2003, 2004, 2007) who discusses perception and policy issues of
environmental pollution in an AK–type framework, but disregards trade–off effects
between consumption and leisure, as well as how individual household’s savings
decision relates to a differentiated factor income risk.
In this paper we combine the traditional environmental economics literature on
growth and the environment with the strand of literature dealing with labor sup-
ply in a stochastic setting. The analysis is motivated by the well–known result from
the literature that the riskiness of capital returns and labor income is an important
determinant of the intertemporal savings decision of risk averse agents. In his pi-
oneering work Leland (1968) stressed the role of precautionary savings, which he
defined as savings, a risk averse household additionally undertakes in order to self–
insure against the riskiness of future income flows. Especially in the context of mod-
1For a general overview of the role of uncertainty in economics see Pindyck (2006).
2An extensive review of the related literature can be found in Pittel (2002).
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ern growth theory, this draws a link between intertemporal choice, risk, and growth.
Sandmo (1970) was the first to point out the importance of factor–specific risk related
to the degree of risk aversion for the emergence of precautionary saving.
The majority of modern contributions dealing with continuous–time stochastic
growth, where the economy follows a stochastic trend, suffers from the impor-
tant shortcoming that they confine their analysis to a single income type (mostly
capital risk), in order to maintain analytical tractability (cf Obstfeld, 1994; Smith,
1996; Soretz, 2003, 2004, 2007). Others either view the intertemporal flow of la-
bor income as human wealth and treat it as a ‘quasi accumulating’ hedgeable as-
set (Corsetti, 1997) or assume labor incomes to be instantaneously deterministic
Turnovsky (2000, 2003). Notably exceptions for the case of inelastic labor supply
are Clemens and Soretz (2004) and Clemens (2004b, 2005). Only recently Clemens
(2004a) and Turnovsky and Smith (2006) succeeded in deriving closed–form solu-
tions for the equilibrium growth path of an economy with endogenous labor–leisure
choice, where households simultaneously are subject to capital and income risk.
Besides the phenomenon of precautionary savings, the presence of risk substan-
tially alters the policy implications derived within deterministic environments. This
is due to the fact that taxes (or transfers respectively) also affect the riskiness of
the policy target under consideration. The higher–order effects from the variance of
the underlying risk might even reverse the direction of impact of policy instruments
in a stochastic environment. The insurance effect of taxation was first discussed by
Domar and Musgrave (1944) and Stiglitz (1969), or in a continuous–time growth
context by Turnovsky (1993), Smith (1996) or Clemens and Soretz (1997).
Our model is a stochastic version of the Romer (1986) endogenous growth model
with endogenous labor supply and a negative pollution externality. Pollution is gen-
erated from production activities and can be reduced by devoting part of output to
abatement. Production and abatement are subject to a random disturbance that stems
from an aggregate productivity shock. The economy follows a stochastic trends with
the assumed uncertainty leading to second–order effects on expected labor supply
and growth. The relatively simple model structure with constant private returns to
scale and linearity in capital allows us to derive closed–form solutions.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model for which the
socially optimal growth path is derived as a benchmark solution in Section 3. Section
4 focuses on the market economy. It derives an optimal policy mix and regards the
general implications of regulatory activities on growth and labor supply. Section 5
then compares the results of Section 3 and 4 to the case of exogenous labor supply.
Section 6 concludes.
3
2 The Model
We assume a closed economy in which a homogeneous good is produced from labor
and capital. Individual production is stochastic, i.e. at each increment of time, the
economy is subject to an aggregate productivity shock. The production and invest-
ment processes generate two types of externalities: First, we assume that production
is subject to learning by doing. Production of a single producer is positively affected
by aggregate production experience, and investment activities in privately–owned
capital create a positive externality by raising the productivity of all firms. For sim-
plicity it is assumed that this positive spillover effect is represented one–to–one by
the aggregate level of capital input. This is the standard type of Romer (1986) model.
A second externality arises from environmental pollution P¯(t). Production leads to a
flow of pollution generating a negative effect on production which can be mitigated
by abatement activities. The production technology is assumed to be of the stochastic
Cobb–Douglas type
dY (t) = K(t)αK¯1−α(1− l(t))1−αP¯(t)−η (dt+dz(t)) . (1)
dz(t) is the serially uncorrelated increment to a standard Wiener process z(t) with
zero mean and an instantaneous variance of σ2 d t. Due to the productivity shock, the
returns to the two factors of production are stochastic. In terms of Sandmo (1970),
the household is subject to a capital risk and an income risk.
To generate the instantaneous output flow dY (t), producers employ physical capi-
tal, K(t), and labor, 1− l(t), as a fraction of time endowment. The production displays
constant returns to scale in K(t) and 1− l(t) on the individual firm level. Aggregate
capital accumulation, K¯(t), exerts a positive effect on productivity. In macroeconomic
equilibrium K(t) equals K¯(t), as we normalize the population to unity. Production is
linear in capital on the aggregate level which ensures that the conditions for ongoing
growth of per capita incomes are met. This, together with the assumption that the
productivity shock is proportional to the mean rate of output, implies that the ran-
domness of production does not disappear asymptotically as the output grows. The
economy evolves according to a stochastic trend.
The negative pollution externality is represented by P(t) with the effective flow of
aggregate pollution being given by the ratio of mean output over aggregate abatement
A¯:
P¯(t) =
KαK¯(t)1−α(1− l(t))1−α
A¯(t)
. (2)
Following Pittel (2002) we assume an elasticity of substitution of unity between
abatement and raw pollution as a prerequisite for balanced growth to be consistent
with non–increasing effective pollution in the long–run. Pollution is assumed to be
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a flow variable3 that can be reduced by devoting a share of the output to abatement
activities. As we assume perfect competition with a large number of producers, the
effect of individual production on aggregate pollution is negligible such that, on the
individual level, producers take pollution as exogenous to their production decision.
Consequently, producers would—in the absence of environmental regulation—not
conduct abatement as their perceived marginal return would be zero and effective
pollution would asymptotically grow to infinity. Along the equilibrium growth path,
aggregate pollution should be constant and equal to P¯ = 1/a, with a denoting the
abatement ratio.
The economy is populated by a continuum [0,1] of identical infinitely–lived indi-
viduals who maximize their intertemporal utility out of consumption and leisure
E0
Z
∞
0
[
lnC(t)+
l(t)1−δ
1−δ
]
e−βt dt, if δ> 0, δ = 0 (3)
and lnc(t)+ ln l(t), if δ= 1. l(t) denotes leisure time with δ measuring the household’s
disliking of labor. C(t) is individual consumption and β the rate at which agents
discount future utility.
This intertemporal utility function comprises a number of important characteris-
tics: First, (3) is log–linear in consumption which simultaneously implies that house-
holds are risk averse, with the Arrow/Pratt measure of relative risk aversion RR being
equal to unity. From the literature on precautionary savings under uncertainty (cf.
Levhari and Srinivasan, 1969; Sandmo, 1970) it is well–known that—in this case—
the intertemporal income and substitution effects from capital risk completely offset.
In a model without a preference for leisure, the randomness of production would
then generate certainty–equivalence results regarding the allocation of personal in-
come on consumption and saving. The equilibrium expected growth rate of this econ-
omy would be identical to the growth rate in a deterministic economy, although the
household suffers a welfare loss due to the presence of uncertainty. Since our model
also takes account of risky labor incomes, the chosen specification allows us to focus
entirely on the growth and policy effects of labor income risk. As will become obvious
below, the riskiness of wage incomes affects the labor–leisure choice and influences
optimal pollution as well as optimal pollution taxation.4
Second, by assuming the preferences of agents to be additively separable, the cross
derivatives vanish and the effects of leisure on the marginal utility of consumption
3In the context of deterministic growth models Smulders (1996) have shown that the qualitative
implications of a flow or stock formulation of pollution are equivalent as long as the focus is on balanced
growth.
4The effect of the capital risk on pollution and the optimal policy mix were analyzed, for example,
by Soretz (2003, 2004, 2007).
5
and vice versa are eliminated. Finally, (3) is consistent with a balanced growth path
along which the time share devoted to leisure as well as the return to capital is
constant while consumption grows at a constant rate King and Rebelo (cf 1999).
The aggregate capital stock follows the Itô diffusion process
dK(t) = dY (t)(dt+dz(t))−C(t)dt− A¯(t) [d t+dzA(t)] , (4)
where A¯(t) denotes aggregate abatement expenditure, which also follow a stochastic
process dzA(t) to be endogenously determined in equilibrium.
We now proceed with the derivation of the Pareto–optimal growth path of the
economy which serves as a benchmark solution. The subsequent sections then are
devoted to the analysis of an economic and environmental policy aiming at mimick-
ing the Pareto–optimal path. It will be shown that the Pareto–efficient allocation can
be implemented by means of a subsidy on physical capital and a pollution tax giv-
ing rise to incentives to engage in abatement, combined with lump–sum payments.
Two instruments will be sufficient to induce the efficient time path in a knife–edge
scenario.
3 Social Planner
The benevolent social planner internalizes the two externalities present in the econ-
omy and also takes account of the fact that the diffusion process of abatement is
governed by the exogenous productivity shock, such that dzA = dz. In contrast to
individual producers who only take account of the private returns to capital, the so-
cial planner considers the social return and chooses the intertemporal consumption
path, working time, and abatement efforts such that the spillover effects are inter-
nalized, and capital is payed its social return. In contrast to the standard Romer
(1986) model, where the private capital return unambiguously falls short of the so-
cial returns to investment, this is not necessarily the case in our setting, the results
depending on whether or not the positive learning spillovers are outweighed by the
negative pollution effects.
The maximization problem of the social planner reads5
max
C,l
E0
Z
∞
0
[
lnC(t)+
l1−δ
1−δ
]
e−βt d t, (5)
s.t. dK = dY (d t+dz)−Cd t−A(dt+dz] , K(0) > 0,z(0) = 0 (6)
5In what follows, we drop the time index of variables for expository convenience.
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The stochastic Hamiltonian can be set up as follows (cf. Malliaris and Brock, 1982,
ch. 2.10):
H
(
C,K,A, l,λ, ∂λ∂K
)
= e−βt
[
lnC+
l1−δ
1−δ
]
+λ
[
K1−η(1− l)1−αAη−C−A)
]
+
σ2K
2
∂λ
∂K
with σ2K =
(
K1−η(1− l)(1−α)(1−η)−A
)2
σ2. Maximization yields the following FOCs,
where pollution is already substituted with the abatement ratio a= 1/P¯:
∂H
∂C = e
−βtC−1−λ= 0 (7)
∂H
∂l = e
−βt l−δ− (1−η)(1−α)K(1− l)−αaη
(
λ+ ∂λ∂KK(1− l)
1−ασ2 (aη−a)
)
= 0 (8)
∂H
∂A =
(
ηaη−1−1
)(
λ+ ∂λ∂KK(1− l)
1−ασ2 (aη−a)
)
= 0 (9)
dλ=−∂H∂K d t+
∂λ
∂KσK dz
=−(1−η)(1− l)1−αaη
(
λ+ ∂λ∂Kσ
2K(1− l)1−α (aη−a)
)
d t (10)
+
∂λ
∂KK(1− l)
1−α (aη−a)dz
together with the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
Et [λ(t)K(t)] = 0.
Conditions (7) and (8) relate the marginal utility of consumption and leisure
respectively to the shadow price λ, but (8) also accounts for the random nature
of labor productivity. From condition (9) follows the optimal level of abatement
activities. Equation (10) is a modified version of the optimality condition usually
derived for the state variable K. It describes the stochastic evolution of the shadow
price over time, which also follows a diffusion process.
The solution procedure for the stochastic system (7) to (10) is similar to the
one well–known for deterministic models. We proceed with differentiating (7) with
respect to time to obtain a second expression for the law of motion of the shadow
price λ, which later on can be equated to (10). Application of Itô’s lemma yields the
following expression for dλ:
dλ= e−βtC−1
(
−βdt− dC
C
+
(dC)2
C2
)
. (11)
With aggregate output being subject to a technological disturbance, consumption and
saving become stochastic too. The associated diffusion process for consumption, dC,
can be obtained by applying Itô’s lemma
dC =C′(K)dK+
1
2
C′′(K)(dK)2. (12)
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Since a balanced growth path of the economy is characterized by a time–invariant
growth rate, the consumption-wealth ratio, µ=C/K, the abatement ratio a, as well
as the time fractions allotted to labor and leisure, l and 1− l, have to be constant
over time, too. Otherwise the conditions for balanced growth would not be met. The
solution conjecture of a time–invariant µ is consistent with the underlying isoelastic
preferences and typical for this macroeconomic version of the CCAPM (Eaton, 1981;
Turnovsky, 1993). Hence C′(K) = µ, C′′(K) = 0, dC = µdK, and (dC)2 = µ2(dK)2.
Using the Itô multiplication rules6 finally yields
dλ= λ
[(
−β+µ− (1− l)1−α (aη−a)(1−σ2(1− l)1−α (aη−a)))dt− (1− l)1−α (aη−a)dz] .
(13)
Equating (10) to (13), dividing by λ, and sorting with respect to deterministic and
stochastic components results in[
−β+µ+a(1− l)1−α(1−ηaη−1)+σ2(1− l)2(1−α) (aη−a)
×
(
aη−a+(1−η)aη ∂λ∂K
K
λ
)]
dt =−aη(1− l)1−α
( ∂λ
∂K
K
λ +1
)
dz. (14)
For µ to be non-stochastic over time, the random components on the RHS of (14)
have to exactly offset, which is only the case if
∂λ
∂K =−
λ
K
. (15)
Employing this condition and rearranging finally gives the following expression for
the consumption-capital ratio, reflecting the consumption–saving tradeoff7
µ∗1 = β+a(1− l)1−α
(
ηaη−1−1
)(
1−σ2(1− l)1−α (aη−a)
)
. (16)
Going back to the first-order condition related to labor–leisure choice, (8), utilizing
(15) and rearranging, we derive a second condition for µ, this time reflecting the
consumption–leisure tradeoff
µ∗2 = lδ
(1−α)(1−η)aη
(1− l)α
(
1−σ2(1− l)1−α (aη−a)
)
. (17)
In order to have a positive value for (17) and η< 1, the last term on the RHS has to
be of positive sign. By (10) this represents the certainty equivalent to capital return
r∗s = (1−η)aη(1− l)1−α
(
1−σ2(1− l)1−α (aη−a)
)
. (18)
The certainty equivalent to capital return is the real interest rate of a (hypothetical)
safe asset, which falls below the rental rate to capital by the amount of the risk
6d t×d t = 0, dzi×dz j = ρi jσiσ j dt for i = j, and dzi×dz j = σ2 d t for i= j.
7In what follows asterisks denote the Pareto–efficient values of the macroeconomic variables.
8
premium aη(1−η)(1− l)2(1−α) (aη−a)σ2, because risk averse households demand a
higher expected return for bearing the risk of capital accumulation.8
Utilizing this in the first-order condition for A, (9), we find that this is only satisfied
if 1 = ηaη−1, i.e. when abatement activities take place at the optimal level, if the
marginal damage generated by pollution equals the marginal costs of abatement.
Solving for the optimal level of the abatement ratio we get
a∗ = η
1
1−η . (19)
a∗ is solely determined by the pollution elasticity of production. As economic intu-
ition suggests, the more vulnerable output with respect to pollution, the higher the
abatement ratio, i.e. the higher the share of production used for abatement purposes.
Using this information allows us to rewrite (16) and (17) which reduce to
µ∗1 = β , (20)
µ∗2 = lδ
(1−α)(1−η)η
η
1−η
(1− l)α
(
1−σ2(1− l)1−α(1−η)η
η
1−η
)
. (21)
µ∗1 and µ∗2 are functions of the model primitives and the time allocation only. They
have to be equal in order to be consistent with balanced growth, which also implies
that the time share devoted to leisure has to be time–invariant, too. Since (21) is
a nonlinear function in working time, the optimal time allocation is only implicitly
determined by µ∗1 = µ∗2 and cannot be derived explicitly. Equation (20) also reflects
the well–known certainty equivalent result, which is typical for logarithmic prefer-
ences. Since the social planner internalizes the external effects, capital accumula-
tion is rewarded the social return to capital, which amounts to a pure capital risk.
The optimal consumption–capital ratio is solely determined by the rate of time pref-
erence, and the intertemporal income and substitution effects originating from the
riskiness of the income source exactly offset. This also implies that the consumption-
accumulation decision of the household is independent from the pollution generated
through production.
By substituting (20) and (19) into (21), we get an expression, which implicitly
describes the optimal allocation of time on labor and leisure in the Pareto–efficient
economy:
l−δ =
(1−α)(1−η)η
η
1−η
β(1− l)α
(
1−σ2(1− l)1−α(1−η)η
η
1−η
)
. (22)
An equilibrium growth path is characterized by capital and consumption growing
at a common stochastic rate, that is dK/K = dC/C. The equilibrium expected growth
8The safe asset is purely hypothetical, since we are dealing with an aggregate risk which—by
assumption—cannot be diversified away. There is no safe outside option available.
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rate can be derived by employing the aggregate resource constraint, (4), together
with (20) and (21) and taking expectations. We obtain two expressions for the opti-
mal expected growth rate, which—similarly to the consumption–capital ratios µ∗1 and
µ∗2—implicitly determine the equilibrium allocation of labor:
g∗1 = (1−η)η
η
1−η (1− l)1−α−β (23)
g∗2 = (1−η)η
η
1−η (1− l)1−α
(
1−
(1−α) lδ
1− l
(
1−σ2(1−η)η
η
1−η (1− l)1−α
))
(24)
The economy is in equilibrium if the two growth rates are equal, i.e. g∗1 = g∗2 = g∗, or
equivalently
Δg∗ = g∗1−g∗2 =−β+ (1−α)(1−η)η
η
1−η lδ
(1− l)α
(
1−σ2(1−η)η
η
1−η (1− l)1−α
)
= 0 (25)
Proposition 1 A unique balanced growth path exists, if the certainty equivalent to cap-
ital return is positive and Δg∗ satisfies the following conditions:
(i) Δg∗ is a continuous and monotonic function in the domain l ∈ (0,1).
(ii) The limits of Δ∗ are of opposite sign, that is
sgn lim
l→0
Δg∗ =−sgn lim
l→1
Δg∗ . (26)
Proof: Differentiation of (25) with respect to l gives
∂Δg∗
∂l = (1−α)l
δ
⎡
⎣ rs
(1−η)(1− l)
(δ
l
+
α
1− l
)
+α(1−η)
(
η
η
1−η
(1− l)ασ
)2⎤⎦
For rs > 0, Δg∗ is monotonically decreasing in l, l ∈ (0,1). The limits of Δg∗ with respect to l → 0 and
l→ 1 are given by:
lim
l→0
Δg∗=−β and lim
l→1
Δg∗=∞ 
Optimal leisure is implicitly determined by (20), (21) and (23):
l∗ = 1−
(
η
η
1−η (g∗+β)
) 1
1−α
. (27)
Figure 1 illustrates the result of Proposition 1 and shows that there is an interior
solution for the optimal time allocation.
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Figure 1: Unique equilibrium labor supply in the Pareto–efficient economy
Comparative static analysis of the Pareto–efficient allocation While the optimal
consumption–capital–ratio (20) is only determined by the rate of time preference,
optimal growth and leisure depend on the other model parameters. By employing
the implicit function theorem to (22) we can show how optimal leisure—and labor
input respectively—responds to changes in the model parameters. We focus on those
parameters which seem most interesting to us: η, which reflects the vulnerability of
production with respect to pollution; σ2 which measures the impact of changes in the
riskiness of production; and finally δ, representing the elasticity of marginal utility
with respect to leisure.
From (22), we get the following comparative static results for a variation in the
three model primitives:
d l∗
dσ2
=
lδ
βA
1−α
(1− l)2α−1
(
(1−η)η
η
1−η
)2
> 0 , (28)
d l∗
dδ =−
ln l
A
> 0 , (29)
d l∗
dη =−
lδ
βA
1−α
(1− l)α
(
1−2σ2(1− l)1−α(1−η)η
η
1−η
)
B 0 (30)
with
A=
δ
l
+
α
1− l
+
σ2(1−η)η
η
1−η 1−α
(1−l)α
1−σ2(1−η)η
η
1−η 1−α
(1−l)α
> 0 and B= η
η
1−η
lnη
1−η < 0 .
(28) and (29) show that the planner responds qualitatively in the same way to an
increase in the variance of the technology shock as to an increase in the utility pa-
rameter δ.
In the presence of logarithmic preferences with respect to consumption, an in-
crease in σ2 does not have an effect on the household’s optimal propensity to con-
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sume. Nevertheless, second–order effects from the productivity shock on the labor–
leisure trade–off can be observed. By facing a higher technological risk, the planner
substitutes leisure for labor time in order to compensate for a higher variance associ-
ated with labor input. The increase in σ2 affects the shadow price between consump-
tion and leisure. This becomes obvious, if we go back to equation (22), implicitly
determining the optimal time allocation and derived by equating (7) to (8). The RHS
of (22) becomes smaller. In order to still satisfy the first–order condition (8), the LHS
of (22), measuring marginal utility of leisure, Ul, has to become smaller too, which
is only the case for the underlying concave function and δ given, if the amount of
leisure consumed increases.
As can be seen from (23) the associated decrease in working time causes nega-
tive growth effects. It reduces the net output–capital ratio (output minus abatement
effort) while leaving µ unchanged at the cost of savings and growth
dg∗
dσ2
=−(g∗+β)1−α
1− l
d l
dσ2
< 0 .
An increase in δ reflects an increase in the marginal utility of leisure which also
induces the planner to substitute leisure for labor. As (23) shows, this, too, reduces
savings and growth
dg∗
dδ =−(g
∗+β)1−α
1− l
d l
dδ < 0 .
The response to a change in the pollution elasticity of output, η, crucially depends
on whether the first–order effects (stemming from the mean) or the second–order
(variance) effects prevail
dg∗
dη =−(g
∗+β)1−α
1− l
d l
dη +(1− l)
1−αB 0 .
If we consider the benchmark of a riskless economy (σ = 0), an increase in η un-
ambiguously increases leisure and decreases growth. In this case, a higher η leads
to a reduction in the marginal productivities of the input factors capital and labor,
which—in a market economy—would amount to a decline in the associated factor
prices, thus making working efforts less attractive. The growth effect is further aggra-
vated by an associated increase in optimal abatement (19). In a stochastic setting, we
additionally have a second–order effect from the risk premium, which becomes obvi-
ous, if we substitute (18) into (22), which then reduces to l−δ = (1−α)rs/(β(1− l)).
The social planner takes account of the fact that the households are risk averse and
dislike deviations from a smooth income flow. Changes in η also affect the expected
risk premium, by this translating into labor supply and growth effects, which counter-
act (and even may outweigh) the negative effects from the mean return. As a result,
a higher pollution reagibility of output might raise labor supply and—given that this
increase is sufficiently large—even raise expected growth.
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4 The Market Economy
We now proceed with discussing the market economy. Households ultimately own
firms. Since we initially assumed all individuals to be identical, we will confine our
analysis to the representative consumer, who chooses his intertemporal consumption
flow, working and leisure time, as well as his abatement efforts in order to maximize
his intertemporal welfare (3) subject to his budget constraint, while treating public
policy as exogenous.
We assume that the household is subject to environmental taxation. As a firm
owner he pays a pollution tax but disregards his individual contribution to the overall
level of pollution as a by–product of production activities. The firm owner is subject
to a linear pollution tax at the rate τp. Since the firm–specific flow of pollution, P(t),
generated through production also is subject to the geometric Brownian motion, we
postulate the following diffusion for individual tax payments:
dT p(t) = τpP(t)(d t+dz(t)) . (31)
We assume identical rates for the taxes levied on the deterministic and the random
components of pollution.
The household furthermore receives a subsidy on capital accumulation. The sub-
sidy rate τk is constant and proportional to the level of investment undertaken, such
that subsidy payments follow the diffusion:
dTk(t) = τkK(t)(dt+dz(t)) . (32)
Net government revenues (may they be positive or negative) are redistributed to
households in a lump–sum fashion. The diffusion for lump–sum payment T (t) in case
of a balanced government budget is then given by
dT (t) = dT p(t)−dTk(t) = T (t)(d t+dz(t)) (33)
and, depending on the expenditure and revenue flows, can be stochastic too. We
require the government budget constraint to be met in each period of time, so there
is no government debt or surplus.
The representative agent maximizes individual welfare (3) subject to his budget
constraint dK = dY −Cdt−A(d t+dz)−dT p+dT k+dT , or equivalently
dK =
(
Kα (K¯(1− l))1−α P¯−η−C−A+T − τp
(
Kα (K¯(1− l))1−α
A
)
+ τkK
)
d t
+
(
Kα (K¯(1− l))1−α P¯−η−A+T − τp
(
Kα (K¯(1− l))1−α
A
)
+ τkK
)
dz , (34)
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while taking prices, tax rates and lump-sum payments as exogenously given.
The stochastic Hamiltonian can be set up as follows:
H
(
C,K,A, l,λ, ∂λ∂K
)
= e−βt
(
lnC+
l1−δ
1−δ
)
+λ
(
KαK¯1−α(1− l)1−αP¯−η−C−A+T − τp
(
Kα (K¯(1− l))1−α
A
)
+ τkK
)
+
σ2K
2
∂λ
∂K
where aggregate pollution is exogenous, and
σ2K =
(
Kα (K¯(1− l))1−α aη−A+T − τp
(
Kα (K¯(1− l))1−α
A
)
+ τkK
)2
σ2. (35)
Maximization leads to the following FOCs, where we already haven taken account of
P= 1/a and the government budget constraint (33):
∂H
∂C = e
−βtC−1−λ= 0 (36)
∂H
∂l = e
−βt l−δ−λK 1−α
1− l
(
aη(1− l)1−α−
τp
aK
)(
1 +σ2
∂λ
∂K
K
λ (1− l)
1−α(aη−a)
)
= 0 (37)
∂H
∂A =
(
τp
1
aA
−1
)(
1 +σ2
∂λ
∂K
K
λ (1− l)
1−α(aη−a)
)
= 0 (38)
dλ=−∂H∂K dt+
∂λ
∂KσK dz
=−λ
[(
αaη(1− l)1−α+ τk−α
τp
aK
)(
1 +σ2
∂λ
∂K
K
λ
(
(1− l)1−α(aη−a)
))
d t
+
∂λ
∂K
K
λ
(
(1− l)1−α(aη−a)
)
dz
]
. (39)
The first–order conditions (36) and (37) with respect to consumption and leisure are
identical in structure compared to the associated conditions of the planner problem.
The pollution tax is tied to individually generated pollution. The representative agent
knows that he can avoid/reduce tax payments by voluntarily undertaking abatement
efforts, which is reflected in condition (38).
The solution procedure is similar to the one already outlined above. From (39)
follows the certainty equivalent to capital return, rs:
rs =
(
αaη(1− l)1−α+ τk−α
τp
aK
)
(1−σ2(1− l)1−α(aη−a)). (40)
The equilibrium riskless rate of a (hypothetical) safe asset nicely demonstrates the
multiple ways of how fiscal policies affect accumulation in a risky environment. The
two policy instruments have a twofold impact on the riskless rate. Both affect the
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mean return as well as the risk premium on capital holdings, the latter reflecting the
second–order effects stemming from the variance of the technological disturbance.9
First, the subsidy payed on capital accumulation generally makes savings more at-
tractive. Therefore, the mean real interest rate of a (hypothetical) safe asset has to
increase too, due to the general equilibrium nature of our approach. Second, by
raising the expected capital return, a subsidy also increases the volatility of future
capital income flows, which risk averse agents dislike and makes them demand a
larger risk premium on capital holdings. Although the induced intertemporal income
and substitution effects of changes in the real return to capital offset for the case
of logarithmic preferences in consumption (see (41) and (42) below), they still are
present in the equilibrium value of rs. The effects reverse, if it comes to the pollution
tax. Being tied to current production and putting a burden on capital accumulation,
the pollution tax reduces the deterministic part of the interest rate while raising the
stochastic component. A reduction in the volatility of future capital incomes leads to
a lower risk premium on capital accumulation.
In order to have a positive value of the certainty equivalent to capital return, we
need the first–order effects to prevail, such that the last term on the RHS of (40) is
of positive sign.10
If we next differentiate (36) with respect to time and equate the resulting diffu-
sion process dλ for the shadow price to condition (39), we obtain the desired rela-
tionship for the consumption–capital ratio µ, which we expect to be constant along
the balanced growth path. By additionally taking into account that the government
has to run a balanced budget, we arrive at:
µ1 = β+
(
(1− l)1−α((1−α)aη−a)+ τk+α
τp
aK
)
[1−σ2(1− l)1−α(aη−a)]. (41)
As before, another expression for µ can be obtained from the first–order condition for
leisure:
µ2 =
(1−α) lδ
1− l
(
aη(1− l)1−α−
τp
aK
)[
1−σ2(1− l)1−α(aη−a)
]
. (42)
A comparison between the propensity to consume out of wealth chosen by the social
planner (20) with the one of decentralized market economy (41), shows very clearly
the impact of factor income risk on intertemporal consumption choice, because both
measure the consumption–saving tradeoff. Whereas the social planner rewards cap-
ital its social return—which equals the value of output—and therefore indirectly ne-
glects labor income risk, labor and capital inputs of the market economy are payed
9Recall that r = rs+ risk premium.
10A positive sign of rs is important for existence and uniqueness of the steady state. See also Clemens
(2004a) for an extensive discussion of the feasibility of balanced growth paths in continuous–time
stochastic growth models with elastic labor supply.
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according to their marginal product in production. As Leland (1968) pointed out, de-
creasing absolute risk aversion is necessary and sufficient for households to save out
of precautionary motives in the presence of pure income risk. This condition is met
for any positive value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion RR > 0, which in our
model equals unity by the assumption of log–utility in consumption. Furthermore,
as demonstrated by Levhari and Srinivasan (1969) as well as by Sandmo (1970),
households have to be sufficiently risk averse in the presence of a pure capital risk in
order to undertake buffer stock savings, which for the underlying isoelastic prefer-
ences corresponds to all values of RR > 1. There is no savings effect from the riskiness
of capital incomes for RR = 1. Consequently, if we observe any impact from risk on
intertemporal consumption choice, this can entirely be attributed to the presence of
labor income risk.
The underlying tax–transfer system indirectly redistributes income between labor
and capital, since it subsidizes accumulation while simultaneously taxing pollution
which is created as a by–product of private capital and labor inputs in production.
For any given policy–mix not mimicking the Pareto–efficient allocation, the effects
of labor income risk on consumption and saving prevail and we find µ to be smaller
if compared to a riskless environment (i.e. σ = 0). This indicates the presence of
precautionary savings the household undertakes in order to self–insure against the
fluctuations of future income flows. Compared to the Pareto–efficient allocation and
other things equal, µ is more likely of being too large, because the households only
take into account the lower market returns. They neglect the Marshallian knowledge
externality in their intertemporal decision and consequently save too little.
From the first–order condition for A, (38), we are able to derive an expression for
the optimal relation between l and a:
0 =
(
τp
A
−a
)(
1−σ2(1− l)1−α (aη−a)
)
. (43)
which only is satisfied for a positive value of rs, if τp = aA. From (43) it can be
seen that a constant abatement ratio over time is only consistent with household
optimization if the tax rate increases over time. Due to the accumulation of capital,
the marginal value of a unit of pollution rises over time. Consequently, to keep
pollution from increasing over time, its costs in terms of the tax have to increase as
well (see also Pittel, 2002). At the same time the tax on pollution serves as an implicit
subsidy on abatement which increases in a growing economy. Along any balanced
path the growth rate of the tax has to equal to joint growth rate of abatement and
capital. Substituting τp = aA into (31) shows that tax revenues exactly suffice to pay
for abatement expenditures.
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Considering (41) shows that a constant propensity to consume, which is a prereq-
uisite for balanced growth, requires the subsidy rate on capital to be constant over
time. However, although the rates of the two policy instruments develop differently
over time, their growth rates are of course identical as in the subsidy case the subsidy
basis grows at the same rate as the pollution tax. Nevertheless a balanced budget of
the regulating authority without any lump–sum transfers, i.e. T = 0, can only hold
for an optimal policy in a knife edge case, as will be shown below.
The expected growth rate of the decentralized economy can be obtained from the
aggregate resource constraint (34) under consideration of a balanced government
budget and the two expressions for the propensity to consume, (41) and (42):
g1 = (1− l)1−α(aη−a)−µ1 (44)
g2 = (1− l)1−α(aη−a)−µ2 . (45)
The impact of risk, which negatively affects consumption is of opposite sign in the
expected growth rate of the economy (44), thereby indicating the presence of pre-
cautionary saving, which is empirically supported, e.g. by Zeldes (1989), Caballero
(1990), and Hubbard et al. (1994).
The economy is in equilibrium if the two growth rates are equal, i.e. g1 = g2 = g,
which implicitly determines the equilibrium level of labor supply:
Δg= g1−g2 =−β+ [1−σ2(1− l)1−α((τpA)η− τpA)]
×
[
(1− l)1−α(1−α)
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)( lδ
1− l
−1
)
− τk
]
= 0 (46)
where we considered τp = aA from (43). The associated conditions for existence and
uniqueness of a macroeconomic equilibrium along the balanced growth path closely
resemble those stated for the Pareto–efficient solution in Proposition 1 and therefore
are relegated to the Appendix.
The optimal policy The growth path of the social planner can be replicated by the
appropriate choice of the pollution tax and the capital subsidy. Similar to the standard
deterministic economy, a policy is chosen optimally if we set the two instruments
equal to the marginal externalities of pollution and capital:
τp∗ = ηaηA and τk∗ = (1−η)(1−α)aη(1− l)1−α (47)
Substituting (47) into (43) yields the familiar condition
a
(
ηaη−1−1
)(
1−σ2(1− l)1−α (aη−a)
)
= 0 , (48)
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which is identical to (9), the condition for an optimal provision of A in the social
planner case. Consequently we get for the above described policy:
a= a∗ = η
1
1−η . (49)
If the policy instruments are chosen according to (47) the decentralized economy
replicates the efficient allocation with conditions for propensities to consume and
expected growth rates equal to (20), (21), (23), and (24).
In contrast to a riskless environment, taxation and subsidization now both target
equally at mean economic activities as well as at random fluctuations around the
mean. This potentially opens up the alternative to examine more complex–structured
tax–transfer–systems, for instance, by treating stochastic and deterministic activities
differently at differentiated rates, but is beyond the scope of the present paper (see
e.g. Clemens and Soretz, 1997, 2004; Soretz, 2007).
Although the technology shock has zero mean, the variance of the capital stock
increases over time. Neglecting the stochastic structure of production and abatement
in the policy–mix, would leave polluting economic activities partly untaxed and these
effects would accumulate over time. As the social planner takes account of the tech-
nology risk in his allocation decisions, a solely deterministic fiscal policy runs short
of its target and never suffices to internalize the external effects.
Regarding (47), it can be seen that the pollution externality affects the optimal
level of the capital subsidy. In contrast to an economy without pollution, the learning–
by–doing spillover in our economy has a twofold effect on production: The positive
direct effect on the social return and an indirect negative effect from the repercussions
of capital accumulation on pollution. The optimal subsidy rate in (47) corrects for
the net of the two effects.
Substituting (47) to (49) into (33) shows that lump–sum transfers/taxes are non–
zero except for the knife–edge case in which the negative pollution externality is
exactly offset by the positive net capital externality, i.e. iff α= (1−η)−1. In all other
cases
T ≷ 0 ⇐⇒ η≷ (1−η)(1−α) . (50)
Comparative static analysis of the decentralized allocation In contrast to the so-
cial planner case, the equilibrium propensity to consume differs from the rate of time
preference in the decentralized setting. As households do not internalize the produc-
tion externalities and capital is only awarded its private return, the labor income risk
is not neutralized and influences the consumption decision of households. This also
implies that the consumption–accumulation decision of the household now depends
18
not only on the pollution elasticity of production and the other model parameters,
but also on the tax and subsidy rates.11
To compute the comparative statics of l and g, we equate µ1 to µ2 from (41) and
(42), and additionally take regard of τp = aA, such that
β= [1−σ2(1− l)1−α((τpA)η− τpA)]
[
(1− l)1−α(1−α)
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)( lδ
1− l
−1
)
− τk
]
, (51)
where we define τpA ≡
τp
A for notational simplicity, which measures. As β> 0 and rs > 0
for feasibility reasons, such that also l
δ
1−l > 1, the second term on the RHS is positive
in equilibrium. Employing the implicit function theorem we can derive the following
comparative static results for the policy instruments:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium labor supply decreases with a rise in the subsidy rate
payed on capital accumulation, if the technological risk does not become too large. The
effect of a change in the pollution tax, as measured by τpA, generally is of ambiguous sign
d(1− l)
dτk
< 0 for 1 > 2σ2(1− l)1−α
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)
, (52)
d(1− l)
dτpA
 0 for τp∗A  τ
p
A . (53)
Proof: see Appendix.
An increase in capital subsidization leads an increase in capital formation and a sub-
stitution of capital for labor, such that households can enjoy more leisure. To this
extent our results coincide with the implications of a deterministic setting. However,
besides this static effect, we have a negative dynamic effect of labor–leisure choice on
expected growth. A reduction in labor supply not only reduces total wage income but
also the associated wage income risk, thereby leading to a decline in precautionary
savings. Hence we have counter–acting effects from capital subsidization on growth,
such that the negative effect prevails, if we additionally take account of the govern-
ment budget constraint. For a sufficiently large technology risk, the sign of (57) even
may reverse without violating the imposed feasibility conditions on rs.
Regarding the by–effects on expected growth of a change in τpA, it is not possible
to derive clear–cut results, due to the multitude of interacting adjustments of labor
supply and the marginal productivity of abatement. Nevertheless, it is possible to
identify the response of the equilibrium expected growth rate to a change in the
policy instruments numerically, where the results can be shown to hold for a large
range of parameter values.
11As the comparative static results of a variation in η, σ2, and δ only get more complex without
changing the qualitative results already derived above for the planner economy, we concentrate on the
results for the policy instruments only.
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Figure 2: Comparative static results of a variation in the pollution tax
The response of labor supply to an increase in τpA crucially depends on τ
p∗
A  τ
p
A, i.e.,
whether or not the chosen policy overshoots or falls below its optimal value. Given
that e.g. 1 > 2σ2(1− l)1−α
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)
, labor supply decreases due to a rise in the tax
rate while growth increases if the pollution tax is below its optimal level. Raising
τpA induces an increase in marginal abatement that raises production by more than
the marginal costs of abatement in terms of output. The opposite holds if taxation is
above its optimal level. Figure 2 depicts two such scenarios in which the pollution tax
is either higher (Figure 2(a)) or lower (Figure 2(b)) than the optimal pollution tax
τpA ≈ 0.77.
12 In both subfigures, the right–hand plot shows equilibrium leisure at the
respective tax rate, while the left–hand plot displays the comparative static results for
the growth rate with respect to a change in τpA.
12The parameters in Figure 2 were set to α = 0.2, β = 0.1, δ= 1, η= 0.1, σ = 0.1. For simplicity, the
capital subsidy was set to zero in both subfigures.
20
5 Exogenous labor supply
We want to conclude our analysis with some final remarks on the case of inelas-
tic labor supply. When households have no preference for leisure, the entire time–
endowment is devoted to working, i.e. l = 0. Consequently, the solution for the
exogenous case can be obtained by setting (1− l) equal to unity and disregarding the
FOCs for leisure in the preceding sections.
Social planner It can immediately be seen from (9) and (20) that the optimal
abatement ratio (i.e. optimal pollution, P∗e = 1/a∗e) as well as the optimal propensity
to consume are unaffected by the endogeneity of labor supply:13
a∗e = η
1
1−η , µ∗e = β g∗e = (1−η)η η1−η −β . (54)
Although the optimal share of output devoted to abatement activities remains un-
changed, optimal expected growth rises as production increases due to the higher
input of labor:
g∗e−g∗ = (1−η)η
η
1−η (1− (1− l)1−α) > 0 . (55)
The functional form and sign of this growth differential is independent from the
technology risk. Nevertheless, the randomness of production has an indirect effect
on (55) by affecting the optimal choice of l.
Let us now consider the growth effects of an increase in η, the pollution elasticity
of production, under the two scenarios. If labor supply is exogenous, an increase in
η unambiguously increases growth by raising the abatement ratio. In the endoge-
nous labor setting however, the increase of η additionally changes the optimal labor
choice. As we have seen before, the change in labor supply depends on whether or
not the first–order effect is dominated by the second–order effect stemming from the
variance of the productivity shock. If the first–order effect dominates, optimal labor
supply increases due to an increase in η which raises growth and lowers the growth
differential in (55). If the second–order effect dominates, growth is lowered by a
decrease in labor supply. So while an increase in η unambiguously increases growth
when labor supply is exogenous, it might lower growth for endogenous labor–leisure
choice case. Whether growth rises or falls, crucially depends on the magnitude of the
production risk σ2.
Market economy As can be seen from (38) the equilibrium abatement ratio in
the market economy is still solely determined by the chosen tax policy, a = τpA =
τp
A .
Hence, setting τpA = τ
pe
A results in identical pollution levels for the exogenous and
13The superscript e refers to variable values in the exogenous labor scenario.
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the endogenous labor setting. This also implies that the optimal tax policies are
identical in both cases (τp∗eA = τ
p∗
A = η
η
1−η ). The non–normalized tax rates, τp = η
η
1−ηA,
will however differ between the two scenarios, as A follows a different time path.
Recalling that optimal growth is higher in the exogenous labor case, τp∗e increases
faster than τp∗.
With respect to the optimal capital subsidy, its level is higher when labor is exoge-
nously supplied (τk∗e− τk∗ = (1−η)(1−α)η
η
1−η (1− (1− l)1−α). This result originates
from the fact that the marginal capital externality is higher for exogenous labor sup-
ply, where aggregate labor input is comparably larger.
With respect to the difference between growth rates in the endogenous and ex-
ogenous labor case, the difference again crucially depends on the technological risk:
ge−g= [(τp)η− τp](1− (1− l)1−α)[
α−σ2((1−α)(1−η)((τp)η− τp)(1+(1− l)1−α)+ τk)
]
. (56)
If production is deterministic, growth again is unambiguously higher when labor sup-
ply is inelastic, i.e. the growth differential is positive. Yet, if production is stochastic,
the riskiness of labor income lowers the growth differential and may even reverse its
sign.
As for the growth differential itself, the change in ge− g due to a change in the
capital subsidy is unambiguous in a deterministic setting. In this case τk only has
an indirect effect on growth via its impact on labor supply, leading to an increase
in growth. If production is stochastic, however, an increase in the capital subsidy
additionally increases the volatility of labor income which affects the growth differ-
ential negatively. Whether ge−g rises or falls due to an increase in τk again depends
crucially on the magnitude of the production risk σ2.
The effect of an increase in the pollution tax on the growth gap is not even un-
ambiguous in the deterministic scenario. In this case, higher taxation increases the
abatement ratio but lowers working time, the net effect depending crucially on the
underlying parameter values. Matters get even more complicated in the stochastic
setting, where not only the effect of taxation on labor can either be positive or nega-
tive, but where also the impact of the riskiness of production is of ambiguous sign.
6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the effects of technological risk on long-run growth when
labor supply is elastic and production gives rise to two types of externalities. On
the one hand, production generates a flow of pollution that the individual producer
takes as exogenous and that can be reduced by abatement activities. On the other
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hand, the input of capital induces a positive knowledge spillover. For the described
economy we have then examined the optimal as well as the decentralized balanced
growth path.
With respect to the optimal solution, we have shown that expected growth is not
affected by the aggregate technology shock. As preferences are logarithmic and the
social planner perfectly internalizes the externalities, intertemporal substitution and
income effects exactly offset. Along the balanced path the optimal abatement ratio
is constant and solely determined by the pollution elasticity of output. Whether an
increase in the pollution elasticity affects labor supply and growth positively or neg-
atively depends largely on the volatility of technology. If production is deterministic,
optimal labor supply and growth decrease due to an increase in the pollution reagibil-
ity of production. If production is stochastic, however, second–order effect arise from
the risk premium. Given that the variance of the technology shock is sufficiently high,
these effects might prevail and give rise to an increase in labor supply and growth.
For the market economy, we have first focused on optimal policies that repli-
cate the social planner solution. It has been shown that the randomness of out-
put requires optimal policy schemes to comprise a stochastic component to take ac-
count of the rising volatility of output. Deterministic and stochastic activities can be
taxed/subsidized equally, but might also be treated differently by the policy maker.
In the present paper, we have concentrated on a uniform treatment of stochastic and
deterministic income parts and have left differentiated policies to future research. It
has been shown that a combination of pollution taxation and capital subsidization
can give rise to the optimal solution if the deterministic and stochastic part of the
tax/subsidy rates are set equal to the respective marginal externalities.
Furthermore, we have examined more general properties of non–optimal taxation
and subsidy policies. We showed that these properties can, but do not have to be in
line with the well–known results from deterministic models of pollution and growth.
The inclusion of the technology risk might lead to a reversal of the responses of
labor supply and growth to changes in the model primitives and policy variables. A
comparison of exogenous and endogenous labor supply has furthermore shown that
it is the endogeneity of the labor supply that allows for these potential sign reversals.
In the paper at hand we have assumed pollution to be a flow, thereby allowing
for a straightforward integration into the existing literature on stochastic growth.
Yet, modeling pollution or resources as stock variables might give rise to interesting
additional insights. Especially in the context of climate change, the consideration of
risky stocks seems to be a promising field for future research.
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A Existence and Uniqueness of the Growth Equilibrium in the Market
Economy
Proposition 3 A unique balanced growth path exists for the decentralized econ-
omy if the certainty equivalent of the capital return is positive and 1 > 2σ2(1−
l)1−α
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)
. Under these conditions
(i) Δg is a continuous and monotonically increasing function in the domain l ∈ (0,1).
(ii) The limits of Δ are of opposite sign
sgn lim
l→0
Δg=−sgn lim
l→1
Δg .
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Proof: Differentiation of (46) with respect to l gives
∂Δg∗
∂l = (1−α)(1− l)
−α [(τpA)η− τpA]([1−2σ2(1− l)1−α [(τpA)η− τpA]](1−α)
+
[
1−σ2(1− l)1−α
[
(τpA)
η− τpA
]]
lδ
(δ
l
+
α
1− l
)
+σ2((1−α)lδ(1− l)−α
[
(τpA)
η− τpA
]
− τk)
)
which is positive for rs > 0 and 1 > 2σ2(1− l)1−α
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)
.The limits of Δg∗ with respect to l→ 0 and
l→ 1 are given by:
lim
l→0
Δg=−β−
[
1−σ2
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)]
(1−α)
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)
< 0 and lim
l→1
Δg=∞ 
Proof of Proposition 2
d l
dτk
=
D
C
> 0 (57)
d l
dτp
=
E
C
 0 for τp∗A  τ
p
A (58)
with
C = (1−α)(1− l)−α
[
(τpA)
η− τpA
]([
1−2σ2(1− l)1−α
[
(τpA)
η− τpA
]]
(1−α)
+
[
1−σ2(1− l)1−α
[
(τpA)
η− τpA
]]
lδ
(δ
l
+
α
1− l
)
+σ2((1−α)lδ(1− l)−α
[
(τpA)
η− τpA
]
− τk)
)
> 0
D=
[
1−σ2(1− l)1−α
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)]
> 0
E =−
[
η(τpA)η−1−1
]
(1− l)1−α ×
×
[
(1−α)
[
1−2σ2(1− l)1−α
[
(τpA)
η− τpA
]]( lδ
1− l
−1
)
+σ2τk
]
 0 for τp∗A  τ
p
A
From (51) it follows that (1−α)lδ(1− l)−α
[
(τpA)
η− τpA
]
> τk. The signs of C and E
again depend on 1− 2σ2(1− l)1−α
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)
. A sufficient condition for C and E to
be positive (as postulated in (57) and (58)) is 1 > 2σ2(1− l)1−α
(
(τpA)
η− τpA
)
. In case
this condition does not hold, i.e., if the stochastic part dominates the deterministic
part, the sign of C becomes ambiguous while the sign of E switches.
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